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Abstract
Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes (POMDPs) are rich environ-
ments often used in machine learning. But the issue of information and causal
structures in POMDPs has been relatively little studied. This paper presents the
concepts of equivalent and counterfactually equivalent POMDPs, where agents
cannot distinguish which environment they are in though any observations and
actions. It shows that any POMDP is counterfactually equivalent, for any finite
number of turns, to a deterministic POMDP with all uncertainty concentrated into
the initial state. This construction has a universality property, in that all such deter-
ministic POMDPs define the same ‘pure’ learning processes. This allows a better
understanding of POMDP uncertainty, information, and learning.
1 Introduction
Markov decision processes (MDPs) and Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes
(POMDPs) (Sutton and Barto, 1998; Kaelbling et al., 1998) are useful and common tools in ma-
chine learning, with artificial agents evolving in these environments, generally seeking to maximise
a reward.
But though there has been a lot of work on POMDPs from the practical perspective, there has been
relatively little from the theoretical perspective. This paper aims to partially fill that hole. It first
looks at notions of equivalence in POMDPs: two such structures are equivalent when an agent
cannot distinguish which is which from any actions and observations it takes and makes.
A stronger notion is that of counterfactual equivalence; here, multiple agents sharing the same struc-
ture cannot distinguish it from another though any combinations of actions and observations.
Given these notions, this paper demonstrates that any POMDP will be counterfactually equivalent to
a deterministic POMDP for any numberm of interaction terms. A deterministic POMDP is one who
transition and observation functions are deterministic, and hence all the uncertainty is concentrated
in the initial state.
Having uncertainty expressed in this way allows one to clarify POMDPs from an information per-
spective: what can the agent be said to learn as it evolves in the POMDP, what it can change and
what it can’t. Since the rest of the POMDP is deterministic, an agent that knows the environment
can only gain information about the initial state.
This construction has a universality property, in that all such deterministic POMDPs define the same
pure learning processes, where a pure learning process is one that can be decomposed as sums of
knowledges about the initial state.
This allows better analysis of the causality in the POMDPs, using concepts that were initially de-
signed for environments with the causal structure more naturally encoded, such as causal graphs
(Pearl, 2009).
2 Setup and notation
The reward function in a POMDP is not important, as the focus of this paper is on its causal structure,
with the reward just a component of the observation.
Thus define a partially observable Markov decision process without reward function (POMDP\R)
µ = (S,A,O, T, O, T0) (Choi and Kim, 2011), which consists of
• a finite set of states S,
• a finite set of actionsA,
• a finite set of observationsO,
• a transition probability distribution T : S × A → ∆S (where ∆S is the set of probability
distributions on S),
• a probability distribution T0 ∈ ∆S over the initial state s0,
• an observation probability distribution O : S → ∆O.
This POMDP\R will often be referred to as an environment (though Hadfield-Menell et al. (2017)
refers to similar structures as world models).
The agent interacts with the environment in cycles: initially, the environment is in state s0 (given by
T0), and the agent receives observation o0. At time step t, the environment is in state st−1 ∈ S and
the agent chooses an action at ∈ A. Subsequently the environment transitions to a new state st ∈ S
drawn from the distribution T (st | st−1, at) and the agent then receives an observation ot ∈ O
drawn from the distribution O(ot | st). The underlying states st−1 and st are not directly observed
by the agent.
A history ht = o0a1o1a2o2 . . . atot is a sequence of actions and observations. We denote the set of
all observed histories of length t withHt := (A×O)
t, and byH the set of all histories.
For t′ > t, let at:t′ be the sequence of actions atat+1 . . . at′ , let ot:t′ be the sequence of observations
otot+1 . . . ot′ , and let st:t′ the sequence of states stst+1 . . . st′ . Write ht ≤ ht′ if ht = ht′ or if
ht′ = htat+1ot+1 . . . at′ot′ .
The setΠ is the set of policies, functions pi : H → ∆Amapping histories to probability distributions
over actions. Given a policy pi and environment µ, we get a probability distribution over histories:
µ(o0a1o1 . . . atot | pi) :=
∑
s0:t∈St
T0(s0)
t∏
k=1
O(ok | sk)T (sk | sk−1, ak)pi(ak | a1o1 . . . ak−1ok).
Since µ gives the probabilities of everything except actions, and pi gives the probabilities of actions,
all conditional probabilities between histories, actions, states, and so on, can be computed using µ,
pi, and Bayes’ rule. For instance, let ht, s, and pi be such that µ(ht|s0 = s, pi) 6= 0. Then by Bayes’s
rule:
µ(s0 = s|ht, pi) =
µ(ht|s0 = s, pi)µ(s0 = s|pi)∑
s′∈S µ(ht|s0 = s
′, pi)µ(s0 = s′|pi)
.
Then note that s0 is obviously independent of pi, so this can be rewritten as
µ(s0 = s|ht) =
µ(ht|s0 = s, pi)µ(s0 = s)∑
s′∈S µ(ht|s0 = s
′, pi)µ(s0 = s′)
,
which can be computed from µ. In the case where there exists no pi with µ(ht|s0 = s, pi) 6= 0, set
µ(s0 = s|ht) to 0.
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3 Equivalence and counterfactual equivalence
Definition 1 (Similarity). The environments µ and µ∗ are (observationally) similar if they have the
same sets A, and O. Consequently, they have the same sets of historiesH, and hence the same sets
of policies Π.
3.1 Equivalence
We’ll say that two environments µ and µ∗ are m-equivalent if an agent in one cannot figure out
which one it is in during the firstm turns.
To formalise this:
Definition 2 (Equivalence). The environments µ and µ∗ are m-equivalent if they are similar (and
hence have the same sets of histories), and, for all ht, ht′ ∈ H = H
∗ with t, t′ ≤ m and all policies
pi ∈ Π = Π∗,
µ(ht′ |ht, pi) = µ
∗(ht′ |ht, pi). (1)
If they arem-equivalent for allm, they are equivalent.
3.2 Counterfactual equivalence
We’ll say that two environments µ and µ∗ arem-counterfactually equivalent if multiple agents shar-
ing the same environment, cannot figure out which one they are in during the firstm turns.
This is a bit more tricky to define; in what sense can multiple agents be said to share the same
environment? One idea is that if two agents are in the same state and choose the same action, they
will then move together to the same next state (and make the same next observation).
To formalise this, define:
Definition 3 (Environment policy). The piµ is a deterministic environment policy of lengthm, if it
is triplet (T̂0, T̂ , Ô), where T̂0 ∈ S, Ô : S × {0, . . . ,m} → O, and T̂ : S × A× {1, . . . ,m} → S.
Let Πmµ be the set of all environment policies of lengthm.
The idea is that (T̂0, T̂ , Ô) contain all information as to how the stochasticity in T0, T , and O are
resolved in the environment. The T̂0 gives a single initial state, T̂ (s, a, i) = s
′ means that an agent in
state s on turn i, taking action a, will move to state s′, and Ô(s, i) = o means that an agent arriving
in state s on turn i will make observation o.
The environment µ gives a distribution over elements of Πmµ :
µ(T̂0, T̂ , Ô) = T0(T̂0) ·

 ∏
s∈S,a∈A,1≤i≤m
T
(
T̂ (s, a, i)
∣∣∣s, a) ∏
s∈S,0≤i≤m
O
(
Ô(s, i)
∣∣∣s)

 . (2)
For the first m turns of interaction with the environment, the agent can either see itself as updating
using T0, T , and O, or it can see itself as following a deterministic environment policy piµ, chosen
according to the above probability.
Given an environment policy and an actual policy, the probability of a certain history can be com-
puted. If pi ∈ Π is deterministic, µ(ht|piµ, pi) will be always either 1 or 0, since piµ and pi determin-
istically determine all the states, observations, and actions.
Using µ and Bayes’s rule, this conditional probability can be inverted to compute µ(piµ|ht, pi), which
is µ(piµ|ht) since piµ and pi are independent of each other.
So this gives a formalisation of what it means to have several agents sharing the same environment:
they share an environment policy.
Definition 4 (Counterfactual equivalence). The environments µ and µ∗ are m-counterfactually
equivalent if they are similar, and if for any collection (hti , pii)i≤n of pairs of histories and poli-
cies with ti ≤ m,∑
piµ∈Πmµ
µ(piµ)
∏
i≤n
µ(hti |piµ, pii) =
∑
piµ∗∈Π
m
µ∗
µ∗(pi∗µ)
∏
i≤n
µ∗(hti |piµ∗ , pii) (3)
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If they arem-counterfactually equivalent for allm, they are counterfactually equivalent.
The terms in Equation 3 are the joint probabilities of n agents, using policies pii and sharing the
same environment policy, each seeing the histories hti .
And finally:
Definition 5. If µ and µ∗ are m-equivalent (or m-counterfactually equivalent) for all m, they are
equivalent (or counterfactually equivalent).
A useful result is:
Proposition 6. If the environments µ and µ∗ are m-counterfactually equivalent, then they are m-
equivalent.
Proof. If ht  ht′ , then
µ(ht′ |ht, pi) = 0 = µ
∗(ht′ |ht, pi),
since ht′ is impossible, given ht.
If ht ≤ ht′ , then
µ(ht′ |ht, pi) =
µ(ht′ , ht|pi)
µ(ht|pi)
=
µ(ht′ |pi)
µ(ht|pi)
.
For the counterfactually equivalentµ and µ∗, the case of n = 1, (ht|pi), demonstrates that µ(ht|pi) =
µ∗(ht|pi). The same argument shows µ(ht′ |pi) = µ
∗(ht′ |pi), demonstrating µ(ht′ |ht, pi) =
µ∗(ht′ |ht, pi) and establishing Equation 1.
4 Examples
Consider the µ of Figure 1. This has S = {s0, s
00, s01, s10, s11}, A = {a0, a1}, and O = S. Since
the observations and states are the same, with trivial O, this is actually a Markov Decision process
(Sutton and Barto, 1998). The agent starts in s0, chooses between two actions, an each action leads
separately to one of two outcomes, with equal probability.
s0
a0
a1
s00
s01
s10
s11
1/2
1/2
1/2
1/2
Figure 1: Environment µ: two choices, four outcomes
Compare with µ′ of Figure 2. The actions and observations are the same (hence the two environ-
ments are similar), but the state set is larger. Instead of one initial state, there are two, s00 and s
1
0,
leading to the same observation o0. These two states are equally likely under T0, and lead determin-
istically to different states if the agent chooses a0.
It’s not hard to see that µ and µ′ are counterfactually equivalent. The environmentµ′ has just shifted
the uncertainty about the result of a0, out of T and into the initial distribution T0.
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s00T0(s
0
0) = 1/2
s10T0(s
1
0) = 1/2
a0
a0
a1
a1
s00
s01
s10
s11
o0
1
1/2
1/2
1
1/2
1/2
Figure 2: Environment µ′: two initial states, two choices, four outcomes.
Contrast both of these with the environment µ′′ of Figure 3, which has a the same S, A, O, T0, and
O as µ′, but different behaviour under action a1 (hence a different T ).
It’s not hard to see that all three environments are equivalent: given history o0a
i, the agent is equally
likely to end up in state si0 and si1, and that’s the end of the process.
They are not, however, counterfactually equivalent. There are four environment policies in µ (and
in µ′) of non-zero probability. They can be labeled piij , which sends a
0 to s0i and a1 to s1j . Each
one has probability 1/4.
There are two environment policies in µ′′ of non-zero probability; they can be labeled pii, which
simply chooses the starting state si0. Each one has probability 1/2.
Since there are only two actions and they are only used once, the policies of these environments can
be labeled by that action.
Then consider the two pairs of policies and histories (a0, o0a
0o00) and (a1, o0a
1o11). Under the
environment policy pi01, both these pairs are certainly possible, so they have an non-zero probability
under µ (and µ′). However, (a0, o0a
0o00) is impossible under pi1, while (a
1, o0a
1o11) is impossible
under pi0. So there are no environment policies in µ
′′ that make both those histories possible. Thus
µ′′ is not counterfactually equivalent to µ and µ′.
s00T0(s
0
0) = 1/2
s10T0(s
1
0) = 1/2
a0
a1
a1
a0
s00
s10
s11
s01
o0
1
1
1
1
Figure 3: Environment µ′′: two initial states, two choices, four counterfactually correlated out-
comes.
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5 Underlying deterministic environment
In this section, the environment µ∗ is assumed to have all its special features indicated by a ∗ – so it
will have state space S∗, transitions function T ∗0 , and so on.
The main result is:
Theorem 7. For m and all environments µ, there exists an environment µ∗ that is m-
counterfactually equivalent to µ, and on which the transition function T ∗, and the observation
function O∗, are both deterministic.
Proof. Let A∗ = A and O∗ = O, so µ and µ∗ are similar.
Define S∗ = S ×Πmµ × {0, . . . ,m}.
Recall that any piµ ∈ Π
m
µ decomposes as (T̂0, T̂ , Ô). The deterministic O
∗ is defined as sending the
state (s, piµ, i) to Ô(s, i). The deterministic T
∗ is defined as mapping (s, piµ, i) and the action a to
(T̂ (s, a, i), piµ, i + 1). For the rest of the proof, we’ll see T
∗ and O∗ as functions, mapping into S∗
and O∗ = O.
The initial distribution T ∗0 (s, piµ, i) is µ(piµ) if s = T̂0 and i = 0, and is 0 otherwise. This defines
µ∗.
We now need to show that µ and µ∗ arem-counterfactually equivalent. The proof is not conceptually
difficult, one just has to pay careful attention to the notation.
Let Q∗ ⊂ Πmµ∗ be defined as the elements piµ∗ of the form
1 ((T̂0, piµ, 0), T
∗, O∗), for T̂0 given by
piµ. Let f be the (bijective) map taking such piµ∗ to the corresponding piµ.
Since T ∗ and O∗ are deterministic, Equation 2 and the definition of T ∗0 imply that µ
∗(piµ∗) = 0 if
piµ∗ /∈ Q
∗. Again by the definition of T ∗0 :
µ∗(piµ∗) = µ(f(piµ∗)). (4)
Then note that T ∗ preserves the middle component of (s, piµ, i). Given a state (s, piµ, i) and an
action a, the next state and observation in µ∗ will be given by (T̂ (s, a, i), piµ, i+ 1) and Ô(s, i+ 1).
Similarly, given the state s, environmental policy piµ, and action a, the next state and observation in
µ will be given by T̂ (s, a, i) and Ô(s, i + 1).
So an agent in µ∗, starting in (T̂0, piµ, 0), and an agent in µ, having environment policy piµ (and hence
starting in T̂0), would, if they chose the same actions, see the same observations. Now, ‘starting in
(T̂0, piµ, 0)’ can be rephrased as ‘having environment policy f
−1(piµ)’. Since the policies of the
agent are dependent on actions and observations only, this means that for all ht ∈ H and pi ∈ Π:
µ∗(ht|piµ∗ , pi) = µ(ht|f(piµ∗), pi). (5)
Together, Equation 4 and Equation 5 give the desired equality of Equation 3: for collections
(hti , pii)i≤n of history-policy pairs with ti ≤ m,∑
piµ∗∈Π
m
µ∗
µ∗(pi∗µ)
∏
i≤n
µ∗(hti |piµ∗ , pii) =
∑
piµ∗∈Q
∗
µ∗(piµ∗)
∏
i≤n
µ∗(hti |piµ∗ , pii)
=
∑
piµ∗∈Q
∗
µ(f(piµ∗))
∏
i≤n
µ(hti |f(piµ∗), pii)
=
∑
piµ∈Πmµ
µ(piµ)
∏
i≤n
µ(hti |piµ, pii),
since f is a surjection onto Πmµ .
1 Ignoring the extra variable: for all i, T ∗(s∗, a, i) := T ∗(s∗, a) and O∗(s∗, i) := O∗(s∗).
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In the above construction, all the uncertainty and stochasticity of the initial µ has been concentrated
into the distribution T ∗0 over the initial state s
∗
0 in µ
∗.
Note that though the construction will work for every m, the size of S∗ increases with m, so the
limit of this µ∗ asm→∞ has a countable infinite number of states, rather than a finite number.
5.1 ‘Universality’ of the underlying deterministic environment
For many µ, much simpler constructions are possible. See for instance environment µ∗ of Figure 4.
It is deterministic in O∗ and T ∗, and counterfactually equivalent to µ and µ′ in Section 4. But µ has
5 states and 10 state-action pairs, so there are 5× 510 different environment policies2, meaning that
S ×Π1µ × {0, 1} is of magnitude 5
12 × 2 = 488281250, much larger than the 8 states of µ∗.
s000T0(s
00
0 ) = 1/4
s010T0(s
01
0 ) = 1/4
s100T0(s
10
0 ) = 1/4
s110T0(s
11
0 ) = 1/4
a0
a1
a1
a0
s00
s10
s11
s01
o0
1
1
1
1
Figure 4: Environment µ∗: four initial states, two choices, four outcomes.
This poses the question, as to which deterministic POMDP is preferable to model the initial POMDP.
Fortunately, there is a level at which all counterfactually equivalent deterministic POMDPs are the
same.
Definition 8 (Pure learning process). On µ, let P : H≤m → [0, 1] be a map from histories of length
m or less, to the unit interval. Then P is a pure learning process if there exists a deterministic µ∗,
m-counterfactually equivalent to µ, such that P can be expressed as
P (ht) =
∑
s∈S∗
ps∗µ
∗(s∗0 = s
∗|ht), (6)
for constants ps∗ ∈ [0, 1].
These pure learning processes are seen to compute a probability over the stochastic elements of the
environment. Then the universality result is:
Theorem 9. Let P be a pure learning process on µ, and let µ∗ be deterministic and m-
counterfactually equivalent to µ. Then there exists constants ps∗ for s ∈ S, such that P can be
defined as in Equation 6.
Proof. Since P is a pure learning process, we already know that there exists a deterministic en-
vironment, m-counterfactually equivalent to µ, where P decomposes as Equation 6. Since being
m-counferfactually equivalent is a transitive property, we may as well assume that µ itself is this
environment.
We now need to define the ps∗ on µ
∗, and show they generate the same P .
Let Π0 ⊂ Π be the set of deterministic policies. Since µ is deterministic itself, apart from T0, a
choice of s0 and a choice of pi ∈ Π0 determines a unique history hm of length m. Therefore each
2 Though only 4 of non-zero probability.
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s ∈ S defines a map fs : Π0 → Hm. Define the subset F(fs) as the set of all s
′ such that fs = fs′ ;
these subsets form a partition of S.
Since µ∗ is also deterministic, its state space S∗ has a similar partition.
Given an fs, define the collection of pairs (fs(pii), pii)pii∈Π0 . For a deterministic environment, an
environment policy of non-zero probability is just a choice of initial state. So, writing µ(s) for
µ(s0 = s) = T0(s), Equation 3 with that collection of pairs becomes:∑
s′∈S
µ(s′)
∏
pii∈Π0
µ(fs(pii)|s
′, pii) =
∑
s∗∈S∗
µ∗(s∗)
∏
pii∈Π0
µ∗(fs∗(pii)|s
∗, pii). (7)
Since everything is deterministic, the expression
∏
pii∈Π0
µ(fs(pii)|s
′, pii) must be either 0 or 1, and
it is 1 only if s′ ∈ F(fs). Thus Equation 7 can be further rewritten as∑
s′∈F(fs)
µ(s′)1 =
∑
s∗∈F∗(fs)
µ∗(s∗)1.
This demonstrates that the probability under µ of any F(fs), is the same as the probability under µ
∗
of F∗(fs); so, writing µ(F(fs)) for µ(s0 ∈ F(fs),
µ(F(fs)) = µ
∗(F∗(fs)). (8)
So for all s∗ ∈ F∗(fs), with µ
∗(s∗) 6= 0, define
ps∗ =
∑
s′∈F(fs)
µ(s′)ps′
µ(F(fs))
.
Thus ps∗ for s
∗ ∈ F(fs) is equal to the weighted average of ps in F(fs) ⊂ S. For the s
∗ with
µ(s∗) = 0, set ps∗ to any value. This defines the ps∗ , and hence a P
∗ onH via Equation 6.
We now need to show that P = P ∗. Note first that∑
s∗∈F∗(fs)
µ∗(s∗)ps∗ =
µ∗(F∗(fs))
µ(F(fs))
∑
s′∈F(fs)
µ(s′)ps′
=
∑
s′∈F(fs)
µ(s′)ps′ .
(9)
Now let ht be a history with t ≤ m, and pi any deterministic policy that, upon given an initial
segment ht′ < ht, will generate the action at′+1. Thus pi is a policy that could allow ht to happen.
Let S(ht) be the set of all s ∈ S such that ht ≤ fs(pi) ∈ Hm. This means that, if the agent started
in s and followed pi, it would generate a history containing ht – hence that it would generate ht.
That set can be written as a union S(ht) =
⋃
ht≤fs(pi)
F(fs). The observation of ht is thus equiva-
lent to s0 ∈ S(ht). Consequently
P (ht) =
∑
s′∈S(ht)
µ(s′)ps
µ(S(ht))
=
∑
fs:ht≤fs(pi)
∑
s′∈F(fs)
µ(s′)ps∑
fs:ht≤fs(pi)
µ(F(fs))
=
∑
fs:ht≤fs(pi)
∑
s∗∈F∗(fs)
µ∗(s∗)ps∗∑
fs:ht≤fs(pi)
µ∗(F(fs))
= P ∗(ht),
by Equation 8 and Equation 9.
Thus any deterministic m-counterfactually equivalent environment can be used to define any pure
learning process: they are all interchangeable for this purpose.
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